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This paper investigates whether the minimum wage leads to inefficient job rationing. By not allowing
wages to clear the labor market, the minimum wage could cause workers with low reservation wages
to be rationed out while equally skilled workers with higher reservation wages are employed.  This
paper exploits the overlapping nature of the CPS panels to more precisely identify those most affected
by the minimum wage, a group I refer to as the "unskilled." I test for inefficient rationing by examining
whether the reservation wages of employed unskilled workers in states where the 1990-1991 federal
minimum wage increase had the largest impact rose relative to reservation wages of unskilled workers
in other states.  I find that reservation wages of unskilled workers in high-impact states did not rise
relative to reservation wages in other states, indicating that the increase in the minimum wage did
not cause jobs to be allocated less efficiently.
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1.  Introduction 
  Debates  about  the  minimum  wage  tend  to  center  on  the  relative  magnitudes  of  its 
redistributive benefits and unemployment costs.  The debate about the employment effects of the 
minimum wage has been especially heated (see, Burkhauser et al., 2000; Card, 1992; Card and 
Krueger, 1994, 1995; Card et al., 1994; Deere et al., 1995; Katz and Krueger, 1992; Neumark 
and Wascher, 1992, 1994, 2000; and Singell and Terborg 2005).  Brown (1999) and Neumark 
and Wascher (2007) give comprehensive overviews of the debate of the possible employment 
cost of the minimum wage.   
However, the costs of the minimum wage are not necessarily limited to unemployment.  
The minimum wage also interferes with the allocative function of the labor market and could 
thus lead to an inefficient allocation of workers to jobs (Friedman and Stigler, 1946; Lott, 1990).  
Even if the increase in the minimum wage has no impact on total employment, it can cause 
inefficient rationing.  This happens if workers who were unwilling to work at the old and lower 
minimum wage displace current workers of the same skill level.  In this case, workers with 
reservation wages below the old minimum wage are replaced by workers with reservation wages 
above the old minimum wage.  The deadweight loss of such inefficient rationing is equal to the 
difference between the reservation wages of these two types of workers and, as Glaeser and 
Luttmer (2003) point out, this deadweight loss is typically a first-order loss.  
  Theory cannot tell us a priori whether rationing will be efficient or not.  Rationing is 
efficient if, for each group of people with the same marginal product, all non-employed people 
have a reservation wage that equals or exceeds the reservation wage of any employed person.  In 
other words, it must be impossible to increase social welfare by interchanging employed and   3 
non-employed individuals with the same skill level.
1  This concept of efficient rationing takes 
employment at each level of skill as given and ignores other potentially important costs of the 
rationing process itself such as queuing costs (see Barzel, 1974, and Suen, 1989). Rationing may 
result in an efficient job allocation if those with the lowest reservation wages are willing to spend 
more effort in activities that increase the chance of getting a job.  However, rationing will be 
inefficient if employers randomly select employees with heterogeneous reservation wages from 
an excess supply of potential employees of the same skill. Inefficient rationing also results if, for 
some reason, those with high reservation wages have an edge in obtaining jobs over persons with 
low reservation wages.
2 
  This paper examines empirically whether higher minimum wages reduce the efficiency of 
the  allocation  of  jobs.
3  Misallocation  and  rent-seeking  costs  of  price  controls  have  been 
empirically estimated in other settings, most notably for the gasoline market by Deacon and 
Sonstelie (1989) and Frech and Lee (1987), for the housing rental market by Glaeser and Luttmer 
(2003), and for the natural gas market by Davis and Killian (2007).  Linneman (1982) and Lang 
and Kahn (1998) give evidence that minimum wages affect the composition of employment, thus 
hinting that the rationing process may favor certain types of workers. Palda (2000) simulates the 
deadweight loss of rationing under the assumption that rationing is random.  To my knowledge, 
however, this is the first study that empirically examines whether the minimum wage leads to 
inefficient job rationing.   
                                                             
1 The benefit of using a rationing concept that takes employment at each skill level as given is that it eliminates the need to 
estimate the effect of a change in employment at one skill level on the marginal product of workers of other skill levels who are 
substitutes or complements in the production function. 
2 For example, this could be the case if persons who live in a household with another working adult both have relatively high 
reservation wages and have an edge in getting a job due to the connections of the working member in their household. 
3 Holzer, Katz and Krueger (1991) find that minimum wage jobs attract more applicants than jobs that pay either slightly more or 
slightly less.  This constitutes the most direct evidence that the minimum wage leads to rationing.   4 
Because the minimum wage is only binding for a relatively small group of unskilled 
individuals, it is necessary to accurately identify these individuals in order to obtain precise 
estimates of minimum-wage effects.  This paper develops a novel measure of skill to identify 
these individuals.  Rather than measuring skill by characteristics such as age, education, industry 
or occupation, this paper uses market wages.  For a given state and year, a person’s wage is a 
reflection of her skill as valued by the market.  Over time, however, the wage that a person with 
a constant skill level earns may change for many reasons such as changes in technology or in the 
minimum wage.  Thus, to use the wage as a measure of skill, it is important to net out these state-
specific changes in the returns to skill.  I exploit the panel nature of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) to estimate state-specific changes in returns to skill and use these estimates to infer 
skill from wages in different years. Using these wage-based skill measures, I divide the working 
population into four skill groups: an unskilled, a low skilled, a semi-skilled and a skilled group.  
The skill levels of these groups correspond respectively to the first, second, third, and top seven 
wage deciles of the 1989 state wage distribution.  
  The 1990/91 federal minimum wage increase (from $3.45 to $4.25) had a greater impact 
in some states than in others because of differences in state minimum wages, skill composition, 
and nominal returns to skill. I measure the degree of the impact by the fraction of workers in 
each state earning from $3.35 to $4.24 per hour in 1989.  The impact of the federal minimum 
wage increase varied not only across state, but also across skill groups within a given state.  I use 
these differences across skill groups as a specification check on the estimates of the efficiency of 
job rationing. 
  Using data from the merged outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey of 
1989 and 1992, I find that employment for the unskilled group fell significantly in states where   5 
the minimum wage impact was large compared to states where it was relatively small.  However, 
this employment reduction seems to be largely offset by increased employment among low-
skilled workers, who are likely to be a close substitute for the unskilled.  This finding implies 
that, for a more broadly defined group of less skilled workers (which includes both unskilled and 
low-skilled workers), no large negative employment impact can be found. 
  Because reservation wages are not available in the CPS, I instead use proxies that are 
likely to be correlated with reservation wages within skill groups, such as the potential income of 
other household members. In a scenario with inefficient rationing, the average reservation wage 
of unskilled workers rises as the minimum wage enables individuals with higher reservation 
wages  to  displace  workers  with  lower  reservation  wages.
4  I  find,  however,  that the  average 
reservation  wage  of  unskilled  workers  fell  between  1989  and  1992  in  the  states  where  the 
minimum  wage  had  the  greatest  impact  relative  to  other  states.    This  fall  in  the  average 
reservation wage is statistically significant for two of the four reservation wage proxies, and 
cannot be explained by changes in the level of employment of unskilled workers.  This finding 
suggests that the minimum wage increase did not lead to inefficient rationing.  The average 
reservation wage proxies did not fall significantly for any of the other skill groups in the high 
impact states, but showed a significant increase in some cases.  Given these results, it seems 
unlikely that exogenous state-specific shocks to reservation wage proxies can explain the relative 
decrease in the average reservation wage of unskilled workers.  
  A caveat to these results is that they are based on a relatively modest minimum wage 
increase  and  only  examine  changes  in  the  allocation  of  jobs  over  a  four-year  period.  They 
therefore do not rule out the possibility that the minimum wage could lead to inefficient rationing 
                                                             
4 Using self-reported reservation wages from another data set, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, I find empirical support for 
the reservation wage proxies.   6 
over  a  longer  time  period  or  that  a  larger  minimum  wage  increase  could  cause  inefficient 
rationing. While the lack of evidence of inefficient rationing bears favorably on the minimum 
wage as an instrument for income redistribution, the estimates of the employment effects of the 
minimum wage suggest caution. I find that employment among the unskilled drops significantly 
in states where the minimum wage had the greatest impact. This loss in employment seems to be 
largely offset by a gain in employment among the low skilled. Hence, while total employment 
may not be significantly affected, some of the poorest members of society are likely to be hurt by 
the minimum wage. 
  
2.  Theoretical Framework 
  It has long been known that one of the potential costs of imposing wage or price controls 
is that jobs or goods may no longer be allocated to those who value them most (Friedman and 
Stigler, 1946).  Various authors have presented theoretical analyses of misallocation and rent-
seeking costs of controls that prevent prices from clearing the market (Barzel, 1974; Weitzman, 
1977;  Suen,  1989;  and  Palda,  2000).    Building  on  this  work,  I  present  a  simple  theoretical 
framework that generates predictions that will enable us to draw inferences from the empirical 
results about the efficiency of rationing.  
The efficiency of rationing is a concern in markets in which there is heterogeneity across 
individuals in their valuation of the good (or job). If all individuals had the same valuation, any 
allocation across individuals would be equally efficient.  In the labor market, the degree to which 
an individual values a job is given by her reservation wage for that job.  For simplicity, I assume 
that jobs are homogeneous.  This implies that an individual’s reservation wage is the same for all   7 
jobs,  which  rules  out  efficiency  losses  from  misallocation  within  a  given  set  of  working 
individuals and a given number of jobs.
5   
Consider a segment of the labor market in which all individuals have the same level of 
skill, i.e. are equally productive from the perspective of a firm.
6 Let there be a continuum of 
these individuals, who are indexed by their reservation wage θ.
7 Their cumulative distribution is 
given  by  G(θ)  and  their  density  by  g(θ).    Each  individual  either  works  full-time  or  is  not 
employed.  To measure the efficiency of the allocation of these individuals to a given number of 
jobs, it is useful to introduce an allocation function p(θ).  This function denotes for each value of 
θ the fraction of individuals with that reservation wage holding a job.  An efficient allocation of 
jobs requires and implies that every person holding a job values this job more than any individual 
without a job.  Hence: 
 
Efficient job allocation 
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with L denoting total employment. In a competitive market, θ
* would equal the market-clearing 
wage.  
  If the market is distorted, the welfare loss per working person from a misallocation of 
jobs is found by comparing social welfare for the observed job allocation, p(θ), to the efficient 
allocation: 
                                                             
5 In the case of heterogeneous jobs, even if the people with the lowest reservation wages obtain jobs, they might not be matched 
to the jobs that they value most.  This type of misallocation can be an additional efficiency cost of price controls.  I cannot test if 
the allocation of workers across jobs is efficient, because that also requires information about job characteristics, which is not 
available in the data used.  However, Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) find that this type of misallocation constitutes a large fraction 
of the misallocation costs of rent-control. 
6 This assumption will be relaxed later to analyze how the imposition of a minimum wage can affect skill groups for which the 
minimum wage is not binding. 
7 I assume that the private reservation wage equals the social reservation wage.  In other words, there is no externality from a job 
being taken by one individual over another.   8 
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Equation 2 shows that the deadweight loss per job from an inefficient job allocation can be 
decomposed into two terms: (i) the actual average reservation wage of all working individuals 
and (ii) the average reservation wage of working individuals under the efficient allocation. This 
second term does not depend on the allocation function but only on total employment (L) and the 
population distribution of reservation wages (g(.)). Rearranging and totally differentiating (2) 
shows that the change in the average reservation wage of individuals is given by: 
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Equation  3  shows  that  changes  in  the  average  reservation  wage  of  working  individuals  that 
cannot be explained by changes in employment indicate a change in the efficiency with which 
jobs are allocated.  To investigate whether the minimum wage causes inefficient rationing, the 
change in the average reservation wage of working individuals is regressed on the impact of the 
minimum wage and a control for changes in employment.  A positive coefficient on the impact 
of the minimum wage on reservation wage indicates that a minimum wage increase leads to a 
higher deadweight loss of job rationing. 
  In a labor market with multiple segments, each consisting of workers with roughly the 
same level of skill, this analysis can be extended to apply to each segment.  Because labor of a 
certain skill level may be a complement or substitute for labor of other skill levels, employment 
changes in one segment may affect labor demand in the other segments. Through this mechanism   9 
the effects of an increase in the minimum wage will not remain limited to those skill segments 
where  the  increase  is  binding.    If  the  minimum  wage  reduces  employment  in  the  unskilled 
segment, and labor demand is not completely inelastic, then labor demand will increase for those 
skill  levels  which  are  substitutes  for  the  unskilled  workers.    It  is  plausible  that  the  closest 
substitutes for the unskilled workers are low-skilled workers.  In this case, demand for low-
skilled workers would increase, possibly increasing their wages such that the minimum wage is 
no longer binding for them. 
  If nearby skill groups are sufficiently close substitutes, the links between the different 
skill segments of the labor market have two important implications.  First, rationing only takes 
place among unskilled workers.  Therefore, it is important to accurately identify the unskilled 
when testing for changes in the efficiency of rationing.  Second, the employment effects of the 
minimum wage are likely to be of opposite signs for unskilled and low-skilled workers.  Hence, 
the measured employment effects of the minimum wage on a group of workers that includes both 
are  likely  to  be  less  pronounced.    This,  too,  suggests  that  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  precise 




3.  Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
3.1  Data 
  The empirical methodology consists of two main steps.  The first step estimates wage 
evolution curves which are needed to construct the wage-based skill measure.  The second step 
estimates how the increase in the federal minimum wage affected employment and the efficiency   10 
of rationing of unskilled individuals.  Because only the first step requires that individuals appear 
in two consecutive years, different samples are used for these two steps. 
  The data used to estimate the wage evolution curves come from the NBER extracts of the 
merged outgoing rotation groups of the Current Population Survey for 1989 to 1992. Because 
approximately half the individuals who are in the outgoing rotation group in one year reappear in 
the outgoing rotation group next year, it is possible to construct three overlapping panels by 
matching individuals who appear in two consecutive years.  Each panel contains approximately 
115,000 persons, consisting of individuals that are matched in two consecutive years.  Because 
many of these individuals, especially those over 65, have a missing or allocated wage in one or 
both years, the sample on which the wage evolution curves are based consists of approximately 
45,000 individuals in each of the three overlapping panels.  Appendix A describes the matching 
procedure. 
  The CPS merged outgoing rotation groups also provide the sample used to examine the 
effects  of  the  minimum  wage  on  employment  and  the  efficiency  of rationing.   This  sample 
combines the outgoing rotation groups from 1989 with those from 1992.  The sample is limited 
to individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 and excludes working people with missing wages, 
allocated wages or wages below $1.00/hr (which are likely to be measurement error).  The wage 
is measured as the hourly wage for hourly workers and as usual weekly earnings divided by 
usual  weekly  hours  for  salaried  workers.    The sample  size  for  1989  and  1992  combined  is 
472,152 observations.  Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the variables in this 
sample. 
 
3.2 Formation of Skill Groups   11 
  Because the minimum wage mainly affects low-wage workers, the accuracy of estimates 
of minimum-wage effects increases with the precision with which these individuals are 
identified.  Researchers often use demographic characteristics such as education or age to 
identify these individuals. In the context of this paper, however, using age to identify low-wage 
workers is problematic since age may also proxy for reservation wages.  I therefore use just 
education as the demographic characteristic to identify low-wage workers, and create three 
education groups: high school dropouts, high school graduates and those with some college or 
more.  
In order to identify those affected by the minimum wage more precisely than is possible 
with education, this paper develops  a methodology that exploits wage data to identify these 
individuals. If we define skill such that wages are strictly increasing in skill within each state-
year cell, the working population can be divided into skill groups based on their observed wages 
in  a  given  state  before  the  minimum  wage  increase.    However,  due  to  the  increase  in  the 
minimum wage and other shock to the labor market, the wages that correspond to each skill level 
likely change over time.  For each skill group, we must therefore identify those individuals, in 
the period after the minimum wage increase, who would have earned the same wage as members 
of that skill group in the period before the minimum wage increase.  Thus, to create groups with 
constant  skill  levels  over  time,  one  needs  to  know  the  1989  wage  and  the1992  wage  that 
corresponds to each skill level. Plotting these two wages for all skill levels in a given state yields 
a so-called “wage-evolution” curve for that state. As illustrated in Figure 1, the wage evolution 
curve tells us how the boundary wages between the skill groups in 1989 (w1,89, w2,89, and w3,89) 
correspond to boundary wages in 1992 (w1,92, w2,92, and w3,92). These boundary wages in 1992   12 
can then be used to construct the skill groups in 1992 that have the same level of skill as the 
corresponding group in 1989. 
 
To  construct  a  wage  evolution  curve,  we  need  two  consecutive  years  of  wage 
observations for individuals with a constant skill level.  It seems likely, however, that the skill 
level of workers observed in two consecutive years of the CPS increases because their work 
experience increases by one year. To correct for the increase in the wage that results from the 
increase in experience, I estimate cross-section regressions of log wage on a spline in age.  I run 
separate regressions with state fixed effects for each sex-race-education cell.
8 The sample is 
restricted  to  workers  with  wage  observations  in  both  years  to  ensure  compatibility  with  the 
sample used for the wage evolution curves.  Hence, the following OLS regressions are run for 
each sex-race-education cell (indexed by k): 
                                                             
8 There are 2 sex categories, 2 race categories (black and non-black) and 4 education categories (high school dropout, high school 
graduate, some college, and college & beyond) yielding 16 sex-race-education cells. 
Figure 1: Example of a state-specific wage evolution curve 
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where i indexes individuals and s indexes states.  The dependent variable is the log wage in the 
base year and the independent variables are a full set of state dummies (δsk) and a spline in age 
with breakpoints every 4 years.
9 The error term is denoted by εisk. 
  The  estimates  ˆ
kj     are  used  to  adjust  the  second  year  wage  for  the  increase  in  skill 
associated with one extra year of experience. Therefore, we have two wage observations for 
worker i: wagei,t, the actual wage earned in year t,  and  , 1 ˆ i t wage + , an estimate of the wage the 
worker would have earned in year t+1 if his skills had remained constant.
10 These wage pairs are 
used to estimate a separate wage evolution curve for each state. The functional form used for the 
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where i indexes individuals, s indexes states and t indexes years.  The breakpoints of the spline 
are denoted by ln κj and the error term is given by ηist.
11 
  The slope of the wage evolution curve may be too flat because of attenuation bias caused 
by measurement error in the wage in the base year.  To mitigate this bias, I ran exactly the same 
procedure in reverse, which yields an estimate of the inverse of the wage evolution curve.  This 
                                                             
9 In cases with fewer than 25 observations between two breakpoints, breakpoints were removed such that each spline segment 
was based on at least 25 observations. 
10 Specifically, 
   
wˆ agei,t+1 is calculated as 
   
wˆ agei,t+1 = wagei,t+1*exp(  ˆ  kj)  where 
   
wagei,t+1is the observed wage for individual i in 
year t+1 and 
   
ˆ  kj is the estimated regression coefficient in equation (4) for the age category and sex-race-education cell of 
individual i. 
11 The breakpoints in the spline, ln κj, occur at hourly wages of $0.99, $ 3.34 $4.24, $5.49, $6.99, $8.49, $9.99, $12.49, $14.99, 
$17.49, $19.99 and $25.00.  If necessary, spline segments are combined to ensure at least 25 observations in each segment.  
However, the breakpoints at $3.35 and $4.25 are never removed.   14 
estimate  is  biased  towards  zero  as  well.    Under  the  assumption  that  the  distribution  of 
measurement error is constant over time, the biases have the same size, and it is possible to 
obtain an unbiased estimate of the wage evolution curve by combining the biased estimate of the 
wage evolution curve with the biased estimate of its inverse.
12 Using the procedure described 
above, three wage evolution curves are estimated for each state: for 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-
92.  For each state, these three curves are combined to form a single wage evolution curve for 
1989 and 1992, as in Figure 1.   
  The working population is divided into four skill groups: in 1989, the unskilled, the low 
skilled, the semi-skilled and the skilled group consist respectively of workers in the first, second, 
third and in the top seven deciles of the 1989 state wage distribution.  The wage evolution curve 
is  used  to  find  the  1992  wages  that  separate  these  four  skill  levels.    In  1992,  workers  are 
classified into the four skill groups based on their 1992 wage and these boundary wages.  Table 2 
shows the boundary wages that separate these four skill groups in 1989 and in 1992 for each 
state. 
 
3.3  Reservation wage proxies 
  For jobs to be allocated efficiently within a group of equally skilled workers, they must 
be  allocated  to  those  individuals  who  have  the  lowest  reservation  wages.    Thus,  to  test  for 
inefficient job rationing, we need variables that are correlated with reservation wages conditional 
on skill level.  Based on theoretical considerations, I identify the following four reservation wage 
proxies: 
                                                             
12 If the attenuation bias in the wage evolution curve and its inverse are the same, any point (x,y) on the unbiased curve will show 
up as (x,y+v) on the biased wage evolution curve and as (x+v,y) on the biased inverse wage evolution curve, where v is the 
attenuation bias at point (x,y).  The unbiased wage evolution curve can therefore be found by numerically determining the set of 
points (x,y) for which there exists some v such that (x,y+v) lies on the biased wage evolution curve and (x+v,y) on the biased 
inverse wage evolution curve.   15 
(1)    Labor  earnings  of  other  household  members.    This  proxy  variable  is  likely  to  be 
positively correlated with reservation wages because the hardship of non-employment tends 
to be lower if other household members have more income.  Ideally non-labor earnings of 
other household members would also be included but they  are not available in the CPS 
outgoing rotation groups.   
(2)  The number of other employed persons in the household.  This proxy variable is expected 
to be positively correlated with reservation wages because the value of household production 
is likely to be higher if other household members are spending time at work.  Moreover, the 
hardship of non-employment is likely to be lower because the other household members 
provide earnings. 
(3)  The number of other adults in the household, where adults are defined as people aged 20 
and  older.  Because  other  adult  household  members  could  potentially  find  a  reasonably 
paying job, this variable is likely to be positively correlated with reservation wages for the 
reasons mentioned above. 
(4) Younger than 30.  Teenagers and people in their twenties are likely to have a higher 
reservation wage (for a given skill level) because of schooling opportunities available to 
them, the possibility of parental support and fewer financial commitments such as mortgages.  
A number of surveys have asked individuals about their reservation wage; these responses can be 
used  to  test  the  validity  of  these  proxies.
13  In  practice,  three  important  issues  complicate 
validating the reservation wage proxies.  First, some skepticism seems justified concerning the 
                                                             
13 Other studies have used self-reported reservation wages to analyze search behavior and the effects of government actions on 
unemployment.  These studies include Kiefer and Neumann, 1979 (using a survey conducted by Pennsylvania State University), 
Feldstein and Poterba, 1984 (using a 1976 CPS supplement), Holzer, 1986 (using the NLSY) and Jones, 1989 (using a 1982 
survey conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit).  As an alternative approach, Hofler and Murphy (1994) use a stochastic 
frontier regression technique to infer reservation wages from a sample of employed workers.  None of these studies confirm or 
reject the proposed proxies for reservation wage conditional on skill.   16 
degree to which reservation wages can be measured by the answer to “What is the lowest wage 
or salary you would accept on any job?”  Individuals may not know the answer, may engage in 
wishful thinking, or may understate their reservation wage to show they are truly unemployed 
and  rightfully  claim  unemployment  benefits  (especially  if  they  believe  the  government  may 
obtain their answer).  Moreover, the questions are usually vague about the job characteristics and 
opportunities for further search.  Second, the question is typically asked of a select sample such 
as  unemployed  individuals  who  are  actively  seeking  work.    Third,  care  must  be  taken  to 
adequately control for skill, otherwise reservation wage proxies may not reflect the individual’s 
time and effort costs of working but merely reflect the earnings opportunities corresponding to 
the unobserved skill level of that individual. 
  Despite these caveats, it remains valuable to examine whether these reservation wage 
proxies receive empirical support.  Using the self-reported reservation wages from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics, I find that, conditional on skill, each of the four proxies is positively 
correlated  with  self-reported  reservation  wages.    Moreover,  the  correlation  is  statistically 
significant at the 5% level for all but the third proxy (Nr. of other adults in the household).  The 
validation results are described in detail in appendix B. 
 
3.4  Inferring Rationing from Differential Changes in Reservation Wages 
  The federal minimum wage increased from $3.35/hr to $3.80/hr in April 1990 and was 
raised to $4.25 in April 1991.  I measure the impact of the federal minimum wage increases on a 
state by the fraction of workers in that state who earn an hourly wage between $3.35 and $4.24 in 
1989.  This impact measure is listed for each state in the first column of table 2 and varies from 
1.7% for Alaska to 20.3% for Mississippi.  The measure is similar to the one used by Card   17 
(1992),  except  that  he  only  considered  teenage  workers,  whereas  my  sample  includes  all 
workers. 
  The impact of the federal minimum wage differs, not only across states, but also across 
skill groups.  In particular, the impact is greatest on unskilled workers.  This variation in the 
impact of the minimum wage increase across states and skill groups is used to test the effect of 
minimum wages on the efficiency of rationing. 
  Consider  an  increase  in  the  minimum  wage  in  a  state  where  employment  remains 
constant.  Under efficient rationing, the average reservation wage of the employed should not be 
affected.  Under inefficient rationing, however, we would expect the average reservation wage of 
unskilled workers to increase because some non-employed people with high reservation wages 
take jobs of previously employed people with lower reservation wages.  We would expect the 
increase in average reservation wages to show up most strongly for unskilled workers because 
the increase in the minimum wage affects them most.  Next, consider a minimum wage increase 
in a state where employment also changes.  Under efficient rationing, a decrease in employment 
should  decrease  the  average  reservation  wage  of  workers  because  those  with  the  highest 
reservation  wages  are  rationed  out.    Similarly,  an  increase  in  employment  should  raise  the 
average reservation wage of workers under efficient rationing.  Inefficient rationing, however, 
leads to a greater than predicted increase in reservation wages given the change in employment 
in the unskilled group. 
  To examine whether an increase in the minimum wage leads to inefficient rationing, the 
following regressions are run: 
 
    (reservation  wage)sk =  k + impacts k +  employmentsk  k + vsk              (6)   18 
 
where s indexes states and k indexes wage-based skill groups or education groups.  A separate 
regression is run for each of these groups.  The dependent variable is the change between 1989 
and 1992 in the average reservation wage (as measured by one of the four proxies) in group k in 
state  s.    The  key  explanatory  variable  is  impacts,  which  measures  the  impact  of  the  federal 
minimum wage increase on state s by the fraction of workers in that state earning between $3.35 
and  $4.24  in  1989.   I  instrument  impacts  by  its  own  value  lagged  one  year  to  rule  out  the 
possibility that any of the results are driven by random over or under sampling in 1989 of certain 
subgroups of the population.  Random over or under sampling of subgroups that constitute a 
disproportionate share of low-wage workers and have a higher or lower than average reservation 
wage, would create a mechanical correlation between impacts and changes in the reservation 
wage proxies. The second independent variable is Δgroupsizesk , which measures the change 
between  1989  and  1992  in  the  size  of  group  k  in  state  s  as  a  fraction  of  the  working-age 
population in that state.  This variable controls for any changes in the average reservation wage 
that can be attributed to changes in the group’s employment rate.  The error term is denoted by 
vsk. 
  Theory predicts that γk should be positive for the employed groups and negative for the 
non-employed groups if the efficiency of rationing remains constant.  If the minimum wage 
increase has no impact on the efficiency of rationing, theory predicts that βk should be zero for 
all groups.  If the minimum wage increase exacerbates inefficient rationing, βk is positive for the 
unskilled group but equal to zero for the other employed groups for whom the minimum wage is 
not  binding.    Under  inefficient  rationing,  the  average  reservation  wage  of  non-employed 
unskilled  individuals  decreases.    However,  because  non-employed  unskilled  individuals 
constitute only a fraction of the non-employed group, it is doubtful that this effect can be tested   19 
using  the  estimate  of  βk  for  the  non-employed  group.    Following  from  these  predictions, 
estimates of βk that are only positive for unskilled workers but not for the other groups would 
indicate that a minimum wage increase reduces the efficiency of the allocation of jobs.   
For the education groups, theory predicts that inefficient rationing will lead to a positive 
βk for the employed and that βk will be larger for less educated workers than for more educated 
workers.  Under inefficient rationing, βk will be negative for the non-employed and βk will be 
more  negative  for  less  educated  individuals.    Finally,  one  can  control  for  reservation-wage 
shocks that are unrelated to the minimum wage increase and specific to education groups and 
states by taking the difference between the βk of employed and non-employed individuals in each 
education group.  Hence, under inefficient rationing, this difference (Δβk) should be positive and 
decreasing with education. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
4.1  Effects on Wages and Employment 
  Before turning to the main question of whether the increase in the minimum wage led to 
inefficient  rationing, I  present  estimates  of  the  impact  of  the minimum  wage  on  wages  and 
employment.  The estimates of the effect of the minimum wage on wages serve as a joint check 
on the impact measure and the estimates of the wage evolution curves.  The estimates of the 
impact of the minimum wage on employment by skill level are of direct interest to policy. 
  To examine whether wages evolved differently in states where the impact of the federal 
minimum wage increase was relatively large, the following regressions were run: 
 
Δwagesk = αk + impacts βk + εsk ,   (7)   20 
 
where Δwagesk is the change in the wage (in $) for a worker of skill k (as measured by the 1989 
wage) in state s and impacts is the impact of the federal 1990/91 minimum wage increase on state 
s (as measured by the fraction of workers in 1989 with wages between $3.25 and $4.24).  For 
each skill level, a separate cross-section IV regression is run with 51 observations.  The impact 
measure is instrumented by its own lag of one year to rule out the possibility of a mechanical 
correlation due to sampling variation. 
  Figure 2 graphs the coefficients βk and the corresponding confidence intervals, which are 
based  on  Huber/White  robust  standard  errors.    The  figure  shows  that  the  coefficients 
corresponding to skill levels of $3.00 to $3.35 are not significantly different from zero.  This 
result should come as no surprise because the wages of workers in these skill levels must be 
raised to the new legal minimum of $4.25 independently of the fraction of workers who are 
affected by this change.  The coefficients corresponding to skill levels from $4.00 to $5.00 are 
significantly positive.  This finding is consistent with the case that workers with skill levels in 
the $4.00 to $5.00 range are close substitutes for workers with skill levels around $3.35.  In 
states where a larger fraction of workers are affected by the minimum wage increase, one would 
expect a bigger drop in employment among unskilled workers, which increases the wages of 
workers who are close substitutes for them.  The magnitude of the coefficient, about 4, implies 
that the wages of workers with skill levels between $4.00 and $5.00 increased by about 75 cents 
more in the highest impact state, Mississippi, than in the lowest impact state, Alaska.  The wages 
of workers of skill levels corresponding to $6.00 and up are not significantly affected by the 
impact of the minimum wage on their state. 
  To  examine  the  effect  of  the  minimum  wage  increase  on  employment,  I  classified 
individuals into wage-based skill groups and into education groups, as described in section 2.    21 
Table 3a shows the summary statistics for the 4 wage-based skill groups and for the group of 
non-employed  individuals.    This  table  shows  that  unskilled  workers  are  disproportionately 
young, female, single and less educated and live in households with more other adults.  While 
unskilled workers have the highest rate of high school dropouts, the other skill groups still have 
substantial high school dropout rates.  The same holds for the other dimensions along which 
unskilled workers are over-represented.  This implies that skill groups based on any of these 
other variables would span a relatively large range of skills as measured by the wage employers 
are willing to pay these individuals.  Table 3b shows the summary statistics for the education 
groups.  It shows that employed high school dropouts are disproportionately young, male, black, 
single  and  from  households  with  more  other  adults.    This  reveals  some  striking  differences 
between the high school dropouts and the unskilled.  High school dropouts are disproportionately 
male whereas unskilled workers are disproportionately female.  Unskilled workers are also much 
younger and more often single than high school dropouts.  Finally, the fact that less than 25% of 
the high school dropouts earn wages in the bottom wage decile implies that even high school 
dropouts span a considerable range of skills as measured by wages. 
  Table 4 shows how the level of employment for each skill group is affected by the impact 
of the federal minimum wage increase.  Panel A shows the results for the wage-based skill 
groups.  It shows that the unskilled experienced a large and significant decline in employment in 
states where more workers were covered by the federal minimum wage increase compared to 
other states.  Employment among the low skilled, in contrast, showed a significant increase in 
those states relative to the other states.
14 This is the expected result if the low skilled are close 
                                                             
14 This may be one of the reasons why studies that identified the unskilled by demographics, education or occupation, which is 
likely to be noisy measure of skill, did not tend to find negative employment effects (e.g., see Card, 1992; Katz and Krueger, 
1992; Lang and Kahn, 1998).  Studies that did find negative employment effects often based skill groups on wage information,   22 
substitutes for unskilled workers.  Employment in the other two skill groups also shows a relative 
increase in the high impact states, but this increase is not significant.  It seems very unlikely that 
the large relative decrease in the fraction of non-employed persons in high impact states can be 
explained  by  the  minimum  wage.    Rather,  it  seems  that  high  impact  states  happened  to 
experience favorable economic shocks relative to low impact states.  This makes the drop in 
employment among the unskilled even more striking.  Apparently this drop occurred in spite of 
relatively favorable economic conditions in those states.  These results indicate that, while the 
minimum wage may only have a minor employment impact on a broadly defined group of less 
skilled workers, it has a large negative impact on employment among the least skilled workers.   
  These employment results depend on the accuracy of the estimates of the wage evolution 
curves.  If, for some reason, the wage evolution curves systematically underestimate the wage 
increase for unskilled workers in high impact states, too few individuals will be classified as 
unskilled  in  those  states.    While  figure  2  shows  that  the  wage  evolution  curves  estimate  a 
relatively large wage increase for the unskilled in the high impact states, one should be aware of 
the sensitivity of the employment effects to any possible bias in the wage evolution curves. 
  The results for the education groups are shown in panel B.  Overall employment in high 
impact states rose relative to low impact states but this rise should probably be attributed to 
relatively favorable economic conditions in high impact states rather than the minimum wage 
since we also find employment increases for groups unlikely to be affected by the minimum 
wage.  While the relative employment increase in high impact states was less pronounced for 
high school dropouts than for high school graduates, much of this difference arises because 
employed high school dropouts comprise a smaller fraction of the working-age population (10%) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
which may identify the unskilled and most affected individuals more precisely.  (e.g., see Abowd et al., 1999; Currie and Fallick, 
1996; and Linneman, 1982).   23 
than employed high school graduates (25%).  It is especially striking that the fraction of non-
employed high school dropouts fell sharply in the high impact states compared to low impact 
states.  Because this fall is nearly four times as large as the employment increase among high 
school dropouts in high impact states, many of the non-employed high school dropouts in high 
impact states must either have migrated to low-impact states or obtained high school degrees.  
Thus, when estimates are based on education groups no clear negative employment impact of the 
minimum wage on low-wage workers is apparent.  However, this lack of an impact may be due 
to  the  fact  that  low-wage  workers  cannot  be  identified  with  enough  precision  by  education 
groups. 
 
4.2 Effects on the Efficiency of Rationing 
  To examine whether the increase in the minimum wage led to a less efficient allocation 
of jobs among unskilled workers, I regress a proxy for the average reservation wage of unskilled 
workers in each state on the impact of the minimum wage increase in that state, controlling for 
changes in the level of employment among the unskilled (see equation 6).  The results of this 
regression are reported for the each of the four reservation wage proxies in the first column of 
panel A of table 5.  Similar regressions are run for the other skill groups to check for exogenous 
state-specific  movements  in  reservation  wage  proxies  that  happen  to  be  correlated  with  the 
impact measure.  These results are reported in the remaining columns. 
  The table shows that the minimum wage had a negative effect on the average reservation 
wage in the unskilled group according to all four proxies.  This decline is significant for two of   24 
the proxies.
15 The coefficient on the change in employment among the unskilled (Δ group size) is 
positive, as theory would predict, for three of the four proxies, but is not significant for any of 
them.  These movements in the average reservation wage suggest that the allocation of jobs 
among unskilled workers, if anything, became relatively more efficient in those states where the 
minimum wage had the largest impact.  These results suggest that the increase in the minimum 
wage did not lead to inefficient rationing. 
  An alternative explanation for these results is that the reservation wage proxies showed a 
relative  decline  in  the  high  impact  states  for  some  reason  unrelated  to  the  minimum-wage 
increase.  In this case, however, one would expect to find negative coefficients on the impact 
measure for all skill groups.  It is striking that these coefficients are all positive (2 of them 
significantly  so)  for  the  low-skilled  group,  which  is  the  group  that  is  most  similar  to  the 
unskilled.
16  Hence,  it  seems  unlikely that an  exogenous relative decline in reservation wage 
proxies in the high impact states can explain the results, unless this decline affected unskilled 
workers without affecting other skill groups.   
  Another alternative explanation for these results is a bias in the formation of the skill 
groups.  In particular, the relative reservation wage of unskilled workers could fall in the high 
impact states if low-skilled workers have lower reservation wages and a greater proportion of 
                                                             
15 Lang and Kahn (1998) find that the employment composition of less skilled workers moved towards teenage and student 
workers in states where the minimum wage impact was largest. Their finding contrasts with my finding that the minimum wage 
increased the fraction of individuals older than 30 among the unskilled workers. Perhaps this difference is due to the measure of 
skill. Lang and Kahn identify less skilled workers as those employed in the eating and drinking establishments and working in 
food service occupations. 
16 To test whether the reservation wages of unskilled workers fell relatively more in the high impact states after controlling for 
any common shocks to the lowest two skill groups in each state, I ran the following regression: 
1 2 ( . ) * * sk s k s k sk sk k sk res wage unskilled impact unskilled groupsize groupsize unskilled v             = + + +  +  +   (8) 
where unskilledk is a dummy variable for unskilled workers, δs is a set of state fixed effects and the remaining variables are the 
same as in equation (6).  The regression is run for unskilled and low skilled workers combined and thus has 102 observations.  
The direct effect of impacts is absorbed by state fixed effects.  The coefficient β is significantly positive for all four reservation 
wage proxies, confirming that the relative drop in the reservation wages of unskilled workers in the high impact states cannot be 
driven by shocks to the lowest two skill groups that happened to be correlated with the impact of the minimum wage increase.   25 
low-skilled workers are misclassified as unskilled in the high impact states in 1992.
17 Three of 
the four reservation wage proxies are indeed lower for the low skilled than for the unskilled (as 
table 3 shows).  It seems unlikely, however, that a greater proportion of low-skilled workers are 
misclassified as unskilled in the high impact states in 1992 because, as table 4 shows, these states 
had  a  relative  increase  in  the  number  of  individuals  classified  as  low  skilled  and  a  relative 
decrease in those classified as unskilled.   
  Panel B of table 5 examines whether the change in the demographic composition of the 
skill groups is also correlated along other dimensions with the impact of the minimum wage 
increase.
18  The first column shows that none of the changes in the demographics of unskilled 
workers is correlated with the impact of the minimum wage at a significance level of 5% or 
lower.  The negative coefficient on high school dropouts, which is significant only at the 10% 
level, suggests that the minimum wage may have led to a relative increase in the average level of 
education of unskilled workers in high impact states.  This might be an indication that some 
variation in skill levels is present even within the unskilled group.  If this is the case and the least 
skilled  within  the  unskilled  group  lost  their  jobs  due  to  the  minimum  wage,  the  average 
education level among unskilled workers would indeed increase.  For the remaining skill groups, 
most of the changes in demographic composition are not significantly related to the impact of the 
minimum  wage.    The  difference  in  the  impact  of  the  minimum  wage  on  the  demographic 
composition  of  unskilled  and  low-skilled  workers  is  insignificant  for  all  demographic 
characteristics  except  the  fraction  married.    It  therefore  seems  unlikely  that  the  differential 
change  in  the  reservation  wage  proxies  for  the  unskilled  in  the  high  impact  states  can  be 
                                                             
17 Note that, for such misclassification to occur, the bias in the estimates of the wage evolution curves would need to be in the 
opposite direction of the bias needed to explain the employment results. 
18 This was tested using the same specification as in regression (8), except that the reservation wage proxy was replaced by a 
demographic characteristic.   26 
explained by random shocks that happened to affect unskilled but not low-skilled workers in 
those states. 
  The results from the wage-based skill groups therefore indicate that the allocation of 
employment has improved for unskilled workers in states where the impact of the minimum 
wage was high relative to other states.  This finding provides evidence against the hypothesis that 
the increase in the federal minimum wage led to inefficient rationing in the labor market. 
  To test the sensitivity of the results to the definition of skill groups, table 6 shows the 
results for education groups.  The first three columns test the effect of the minimum wage on 
reservation wage proxies for the three education groups, and find no significant effect for any of 
the four proxies in any of the three education groups.  These findings are consistent with those of 
the wage-based skill groups.  An advantage of using education groups is that it allows one to 
compare the impact of the minimum wage on employed persons to the impact on non-employed 
persons.    In  this  way,  one  can  control  for  exogenous  shocks  to  reservation  wages  that  are 
common to employed and non-employed individuals.  The last three columns show the impact of 
the minimum wage on the reservation wage proxies of the employed compared to the non-
employed.  This differential impact is insignificant in all cases except on one reservation wage 
proxy,  Δ  employed  persons  in  household,  for the  high  school  dropouts  and  the  high  school 
graduates.  The fact that this impact is significant for both high school dropouts and graduates 
suggests  that  it  is  unlikely  to  be  caused  by  the  minimum  wage,  which  should  have  mainly 
affected high school dropouts.  Like the findings from the wage-based skill groups, the results 
from  the  education  groups  provide  no  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  the  increase  in  the 
minimum wage reduced the efficiency of the job allocation. 
   27 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  In this paper, I examine the impact of the minimum wage on the level and composition of 
employment.    Because  the  minimum  wage  primarily  affects  individuals  whose  skill  level  is 
sufficiently low that the minimum wage is binding for them, it is important to accurately and 
precisely identify these individuals.  I present a new methodology to identify these unskilled 
workers.    Using  the  overlapping  panel  nature  of  the  CPS,  I  estimate  how  the  wages 
corresponding  to  a  constant  skill  level  changed  over  time  in  each  state.    I  then  use  this 
information to infer each worker’s skill from the actual wage paid to this individual. 
  Using this methodology to identify workers’ skills, I find that the 1990/91 increase in the 
federal  minimum  wage  reduced  employment  among  unskilled  workers.    However,  their 
employment reduction seems to be largely compensated for by increased employment among the 
next skill group, which is likely to be a close substitute.  Hence, for a more broadly defined 
group of less skilled workers, I do not find a large negative employment impact.  This may help 
to explain why estimates relying on relatively imprecise measures of skill such as age, education, 
or occupation may not find large employment effects from minimum wage increases. 
  I  find  no  evidence  that  the  minimum  wage  led  to  inefficient  job  rationing  among 
unskilled workers.  If anything, the allocation of jobs seems to have become relatively more 
efficient in states where the impact of the federal minimum wage increase was larger.  In other 
words, those who valued their job least, as measured by four reservation wage proxies, appear to 
have lost their jobs due to the minimum wage increase.   28 
  An advantage of the wage-based skill measure  is that it reflects firms’ valuations of 
skills.  By construction, the unskilled group identifies only low-wage workers, precisely those 
who  are  most  affected  by  a  minimum  wage  increase.    However,  the  methodology  used  to 
construct these wage-based skill groups is relatively complicated and one might be concerned 
that the results could be driven by some bias in the formation of the skill groups.  I show that the 
finding that minimum wages do not adversely affect the efficiency of rationing can only be 
explained by a bias in the skill groups if relatively more low-skilled workers are misclassified as 
unskilled in high impact states.  This, however, seems unlikely because the number of unskilled 
workers fell relative to low skill workers in high impact states.  To further test the robustness of 
the results, I also used education as a measure to identify low-wage workers.  These estimates 
also do not support the hypothesis that minimum wages reduce the efficiency of job allocation.  
While the lower precision with which education identifies low-wage workers perhaps favors 
finding no effect, it is at least reassuring that the results from the wage-based skill groups are not 
contradicted. 
  These results have mixed implications for the desirability of the minimum wage as a 
policy instrument.  The absence of evidence for inefficient rationing suggests that there is no 
need to add the deadweight loss of job misallocation to the other costs associated with minimum 
wages.  On the other hand, the results do indicate that an increase in the minimum wage reduces 
the employment rate of unskilled workers, who are among the poorest members of society.  This 
means  that  policy  makers  who  are  concerned  about  people  at  the  very  bottom  of  the  wage 
distribution should be cautious about advocating the minimum wage as an instrument for income 
redistribution.   29 
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Figure 2: Impact of minimum wage on wage evolution
Notes:  
This graph depicts the differential impact of the federal minimum wage increase on the wage distribution across states.  The 
graph plots the coefficients βk and the corresponding confidence intervals of the following regressions: 
 
Δwagesk = αk + impacts βk + εs,    
 
where Δwagesk is the change in the wage (in $) for a worker of skill k (as measured by the 1989 wage) in state s and impacts is the 
impact of the federal 1990/91 minimum wage increase on state s as measured by the fraction of workers in 1989 with wages 
between $3.25 and $4.24.  For each skill level, a separate cross-section IV regression is run with 51 observations.  The impact 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
         
  1989  1992 
  Mean  Std.  dev.  Mean  Std.  dev. 
Other earnings in household (percentile)
2  0.500  0.289  0.500  0.289 
Nr. of other employed persons in household  0.766  0.715  0.744  0.708 
Nr. of other adults in household  0.944  0.682  0.955  0.684 
Age < 30  0.361  0.480  0.335  0.472 
Male  0.463  0.499  0.466  0.499 
Black  0.126  0.332  0.127  0.333 
Married  0.564  0.496  0.558  0.497 
High school dropout  0.232  0.422  0.213  0.409 
High school graduate  0.354  0.478  0.348  0.476 
Some college  0.237  0.425  0.256  0.436 
College and higher  0.178  0.382  0.183  0.387 
              wage <   3.35  0.015  0.122  0.011  0.103 
   3.35 < wage <   4.25  0.061  0.240  0.009  0.094 
   4.25 < wage <   5.00  0.039  0.194  0.055  0.229 
   5.00 < wage <   6.00  0.072  0.258  0.067  0.251 
   6.00 < wage <   7.00  0.064  0.244  0.061  0.239 
   7.00 < wage <   8.00  0.058  0.234  0.055  0.227 
   8.00 < wage <   9.00  0.053  0.224  0.052  0.222 
   9.00 < wage <  10.00  0.035  0.184  0.036  0.186 
 10.00 < wage < 15.00  0.158  0.365  0.160  0.366 
 15.00 < wage < 20.00  0.068  0.252  0.081  0.274 
 20.00 < wage  0.049  0.216  0.070  0.254 
Not working  0.327  0.469  0.344  0.475 
         
Number of observations  233,251  238,901 
         
Notes: 
1)  The source of the data are the NBER extracts of the CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups.  The universe for this data consists of all non-
institutionalized persons of age 16 and older.  The 1989 sample was selected as follows (with the 1992 figures between parentheses): Of the 
initial 324,711 (332,184) observations, 49,974 (51,984) were dropped because they are older than 65.  A further 1,822 (1,594) observations 
were dropped because their sampling weight is missing.  Finally, 597 (496) observations are dropped because their wage is lower than 
1.00$/hr (which is probably measurement error) and 39,067 (39,209) observations are dropped because they are working but their wage is 
missing or allocated. 
2)  The variable Other earnings in household measures the total labor income (usual weekly earnings) of other household members divided by 
the total number of household members in the sample.  This variable is expressed as a percentile in each state-year cell.  Adults are defined 
as persons of age 20 and older. The variables Nr. of other employed persons in household and Nr. of other adults in household are topcoded 
at 2 to prevent outliers from driving results.  All the remaining variables are dummy variables. 
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Table 2: Minimum wage impact measures and group boundaries 
                     
State  Impact of min. wage 
(% of workers  
in 1989 with:  
 3.35<wage<4.25 ) 
  Wage boundary between 
unskilled and low-skilled 
workers 
  Wage boundary between 
low-skilled and  
semi-skilled workers 
  Wage boundary 
between semi-skilled 
and skilled workers 
      1989  1992    1989  1992    1989  1992 
AK  0.017    5.50  5.30    7.00  8.72    8.50  9.75 
CT  0.022    5.49  5.64    6.83  7.08    8.00  9.89 
CA  0.024    4.50  4.54    5.50  6.28    6.75  7.54 
MA  0.031    5.00  5.16    6.50  6.92    7.50  8.49 
NH  0.032    5.00  5.09    6.00  6.15    7.00  7.07 
RI  0.033    4.75  5.59    5.50  6.18    6.50  7.52 
NJ  0.035    5.00  5.84    6.25  7.38    7.50  8.34 
DC  0.036    5.00  5.77    6.00  6.71    7.15  7.65 
VT  0.051    4.50  5.17    5.50  6.54    6.27  7.27 
MD  0.052    4.75  5.29    6.00  6.75    7.14  8.43 
DE  0.053    4.50  4.80    5.50  6.17    6.50  7.42 
ME  0.054    4.50  4.59    5.41  5.76    6.00  6.25 
NY  0.062    4.50  5.07    5.63  6.20    7.00  7.98 
HI  0.068    4.50  4.99    5.50  6.62    6.67  8.39 
WA  0.074    4.35  5.08    5.40  7.11    6.51  7.73 
NV  0.077    4.50  5.24    5.28  6.44    6.50  7.71 
MN  0.079    4.25  4.80    5.25  5.59    6.25  7.06 
PA  0.082    4.10  4.39    5.10  5.71    6.22  7.42 
VA  0.082    4.05  4.40    5.10  5.84    6.27  6.86 
OR  0.087    4.10  4.93    5.21  6.34    6.25  7.74 
IL  0.092    4.00  4.57    5.00  5.67    6.25  7.43 
FL  0.096    4.00  4.51    5.00  5.77    5.74  6.55 
GA  0.097    4.00  4.86    5.00  5.56    5.95  6.46 
MI  0.098    4.00  4.60    5.00  5.90    6.15  7.28 
NC  0.107    4.00  4.64    5.00  5.53    5.63  6.17 
CO  0.109    4.00  5.35    5.00  6.01    6.00  6.73 
OH  0.109    4.00  4.74    5.00  5.69    6.00  7.10 
AZ  0.111    4.00  4.88    5.00  5.92    5.95  7.00 
UT  0.113    4.00  4.55    4.90  5.79    5.63  6.74 
WI  0.113    4.00  4.41    4.83  6.06    5.75  6.76 
IN  0.117    4.00  4.79    4.75  5.51    5.50  6.23 
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Table 2 continued 
                     
State  Impact of min. wage 
(% of workers  
in 1989 with:  
 3.35<wage<4.25 ) 
  Wage boundary between 
unskilled and low-skilled 
workers 
  Wage boundary between 
low-skilled and semi-
skilled workers 
  Wage boundary 
between semi-skilled 
and skilled workers 
      1989  1992    1989  1992    1989  1992 
MO  0.122    3.65  4.17    4.65  4.98    5.50  6.29 
KA  0.131    3.90  4.40    4.61  5.09    5.60  6.19 
WY  0.134    3.60  4.20    4.50  5.29    5.27  6.68 
IA  0.136    3.80  4.73    4.50  5.45    5.32  6.34 
TX  0.141    3.65  4.06    4.50  5.31    5.25  6.35 
SC  0.142    3.75  3.88    4.50  4.99    5.25  6.17 
ID  0.149    3.65  4.48    4.25  5.02    5.00  5.72 
TN  0.150    3.80  4.64    4.50  5.37    5.25  6.08 
NE  0.154    3.75  4.47    4.46  5.37    5.10  6.06 
OK  0.155    3.65  4.32    4.50  5.45    5.25  6.54 
AL  0.158    3.75  4.18    4.38  4.66    5.00  5.54 
MT  0.163    3.57  4.10    4.30  5.02    5.13  5.95 
ND  0.163    3.75  4.46    4.40  5.16    5.00  5.89 
LA  0.166    3.50  4.20    4.13  4.85    5.00  5.66 
KY  0.169    3.50  3.74    4.15  5.63    5.00  6.17 
NM  0.171    3.50  2.99    4.22  4.73    5.00  5.11 
AR  0.182    3.50  4.13    4.15  4.92    5.00  6.24 
SD  0.185    3.50  3.38    4.00  4.68    5.00  6.07 
WV  0.185    3.35  4.30    4.00  4.40    5.00  5.35 
MS  0.203    3.35  3.62    4.00  4.93    4.63  5.57 
                     
Mean:  0.105    4.10  4.63    5.01  5.79    5.95  6.88 
Std.dev.  0.051    0.53  0.58    0.72  0.81    0.88  1.03 
                     
Notes:    
1)  The variable Impact of minimum wage is a measure of the impact of the 1990/91 federal minimum wage increase on a state.  It is measured 
as the fraction of workers between the ages of 16 and 65 whose wage in 1989 was greater or equal than $3.35/hr and strictly less than 
$4.25/hr.  The wage is measured as the hourly wage for hourly workers and as usual weekly earnings divided by usual weekly hours for 
salaried workers. 
2)  The wage boundary between unskilled and low-skilled workers in 1989 is the wage at the 10
th percentile of the wage distribution in the 
relevant state.  The wage boundary between these two skill categories in 1992 is found by estimating what the wage in that state would be in 
1992 for a worker of the same skill as a worker earning the boundary wage in 1989.  This estimation procedure is described in detail in 
section 3.2.  The 1989 boundary wage between low-skilled and semi-skilled workers is the 20
th percentile of the 1989 state wage 
distribution and the 1989 boundary wage between semi-skilled and skilled workers is set at the 30
th percentile. 
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Table 3a: Summary statistics by wage-based skill group 
           













1989           
Other earnings in household (percentile)
2  0.514  0.522  0.519  0.518  0.463 
Nr. of other employed persons in household  0.978  0.962  0.893  0.756  0.673 
Nr. of other adults in household  1.139  1.094  1.022  0.894  0.934 
Age < 30  0.644  0.563  0.484  0.266  0.379 
           
Male  0.373  0.384  0.422  0.582  0.333 
Black  0.132  0.149  0.141  0.098  0.158 
Married  0.306  0.398  0.480  0.654  0.531 
High school dropout  0.406  0.310  0.222  0.103  0.373 
High school graduate  0.316  0.395  0.432  0.359  0.329 
Some college  0.224  0.238  0.265  0.260  0.199 
College and higher  0.054  0.056  0.081  0.278  0.100 
           
1992           
Other earnings in household (percentile)  0.522  0.514  0.513  0.522  0.462 
Nr. of other employed persons in household  0.967  0.908  0.849  0.737  0.657 
Nr. of other adults in household  1.149  1.094  1.007  0.897  0.954 
Age < 30  0.609  0.537  0.431  0.220  0.371 
           
Male  0.403  0.415  0.426  0.570  0.363 
Black  0.127  0.147  0.139  0.095  0.162 
Married  0.313  0.402  0.503  0.665  0.508 
High school dropout  0.352  0.282  0.181  0.079  0.354 
High school graduate  0.343  0.393  0.441  0.338  0.331 
Some college  0.246  0.266  0.280  0.285  0.212 
College and higher  0.059  0.060  0.097  0.297  0.102 
           
Notes: 
1)   The skill groups are formed as follows.  In 1989, the unskilled are in the lowest decile of the state wage distribution, the low skilled are in 
the second decile of the state wage distribution, the semi-skilled in the third decile of the state wage distribution and the skilled in the top 
seven deciles.  In 1992, the unskilled group is formed by estimating what the 1992 wages in each state would be for workers with the same 
skill as the workers in the unskilled group in 1989 (this estimation procedure is described in detail in section 3.2).  Workers whose 1992 
wages fall in this range are classified as the unskilled in 1992.  Hence, the unskilled group in 1992 does not generally coincide with the first 
decile of the wage distribution in 1992.  The low skilled, the semi-skilled and the skilled groups for 1992 are created analogously. 
2)  The variable Other earnings in household measures the total labor income of other household members divided by the total number of 
household members.  This variable is expressed as a percentile in each state-year cell.  Adults are defined as persons of age 20 and older. 
The variables Nr. of other employed persons in household and Nr. of other adults in household are topcoded at 2 to prevent outliers from 
driving results.  All the remaining variables are dummy variables.   37 
Table 3b: Summary statistics by education group 
               





















1989               
Other earnings in household (percentile)
2  0.489  0.509  0.534    0.437  0.461  0.502 
Nr. of other employed persons in household  0.899  0.816  0.776    0.704  0.633  0.678 
Nr. of other adults in household  1.116  0.952  0.889    1.046  0.855  0.880 
Age < 30  0.419  0.337  0.340    0.465  0.273  0.388 
Male  0.599  0.505  0.519    0.394  0.263  0.332 
Black  0.139  0.121  0.093    0.209  0.143  0.110 
Married  0.497  0.616  0.580    0.392  0.661  0.561 
               
Unskilled  0.223  0.077  0.053    n/a  n/a  n/a 
Low skilled  0.193  0.109  0.063    n/a  n/a  n/a 
Semi-skilled  0.138  0.119  0.074    n/a  n/a  n/a 
Skilled  0.446  0.694  0.809    n/a  n/a  n/a 
               
1992               
Other earnings in household (percentile)  0.490  0.506  0.539    0.441  0.450  0.495 
Nr. of other employed persons in household  0.883  0.794  0.762    0.707  0.613  0.645 
Nr. of other adults in household  1.143  0.962  0.898    1.090  0.883  0.875 
Age < 30  0.402  0.297  0.306    0.487  0.271  0.345 
Male  0.599  0.510  0.507    0.411  0.316  0.359 
Black  0.142  0.122  0.091    0.207  0.157  0.115 
Married  0.489  0.609  0.592    0.366  0.614  0.557 
               
Unskilled  0.215  0.081  0.051    n/a  n/a  n/a 
Low skilled  0.259  0.140  0.082    n/a  n/a  n/a 
















)  The variable Other earnings in household measures the total labor income of other household members divided by the total number of 
household members.  This variable is expressed as a percentile in each state-year cell.  Adults are defined as persons of age 20 and older. 
The variables Nr. of other employed persons in household and Nr. of other adults in household are top-coded at 2 to prevent outliers from 
driving results.  All the remaining variables are dummy variables.   38 
 
Table 4: Effect of minimum wage on employment by skill & education groups 
         
  Impact of  
minimum wage  
(% of workers in 1989 
with: 3.35<wage<4.25) 
Implied percentage 
point change in sizes 
of skill groups in  
MS compared to AK  R
2  N 
Dependent variable:  Coefficient  (S.E.)       
 
Panel A:  By wage-based skill group: 
         
Δ Fraction employed unskilled persons  -0.161  (0.065)  -0.030  0.083  51 
Δ Fraction employed low-skilled persons  0.196  (0.089)  0.036  0.100  51 
Δ Fraction employed semi-skilled persons  0.150  (0.095)  0.028  0.055  51 
Δ Fraction employed skilled persons  0.080  (0.073)  0.015  0.041  51 
Δ Fraction non-employed persons  -0.265  (0.049)  -0.049  0.400  51 
           
Panel B:  By education group:           
Δ Fraction employed high school dropouts  0.033  (0.026)  0.006  0.029  51 
Δ Fraction employed high school graduates  0.141  (0.044)  0.026  0.191  51 
Δ Fraction employed with some college or more  0.090  (0.051)  0.017  0.072  51 
Δ Fraction non-employed high school dropouts  -0.112  (0.037)  -0.021  0.171  51 
Δ Fraction non-employed high school graduates  -0.089  (0.031)  -0.016  0.176  51 
Δ Fraction non-employed with some college or more  -0.064  (0.024)  -0.012  0.084  51 
           
Notes: 
1)   The dependent variable is the percentage point change between 1989 and 1992 in the size of the group as a fraction of the working-age 
population (ages 16-65).  
2)   The independent variable is Impact of minimum wage, which is a measure of the impact of the 1990/91 federal minimum wage increase in 
each state.  It is measured as the fraction of workers between the ages of 16 and 65 whose wage in 1989 was greater than or equal to 
$3.35/hr and strictly less than $4.25/hr.  The wage is measured as the hourly wage for workers for hourly workers and as usual weekly 
earnings divided by usual weekly hours for salaried workers. 
3)   Each line corresponds to a separate cross-section regression with the 51 states as observations.  In each regression, Impact of minimum wage 
is instrumented for by its value lagged one year. Huber/White robust standard errors are reported. 
4)   The last column shows the predicted differential effect of the federal minimum wage increase on the size of the various skill groups in 
Mississippi compared to Alaska. 
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Table 5: Effect of minimum wage on employment composition by skill group 
 

















               
Panel A: Reservation wage proxies:   
1)  Impact of min. wage  -0.156  0.166  0.124  -0.017  -0.020 
    (0.101)  (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.031)  (0.057) 
  Δ Group size  0.093  -0.102  -0.051  -0.070  0.094 
 
Δ Other earnings 
 in household 
(percentiles) 
  (0.190)  (0.182)  (0.154)  (0.058)  (0.106) 
               
2)  Impact of min. wage  -0.218  0.773  0.441  0.260  -0.265 
    (0.285)  (0.227)  (0.307)  (0.138)  (0.159) 
  Δ Group size  -0.010  0.159  0.240  0.130  -0.825 
 
Δ Nr. of other 
employed persons 
in household 
  (0.531)  (0.584)  (0.557)  (0.233)  (0.336) 
               
3)  Impact of min. wage  -0.776  0.000  -0.228  -0.085  -0.418 
    (0.293)  (0.262)  (0.308)  (0.107)  (0.231) 
  Δ Group size  0.300  0.090  0.199  0.143  -0.757 
 
Δ Nr. of other 
adults in household 
  (0.588)  (0.524)  (0.550)  (0.145)  (0.509) 
               
4)  Impact of min. wage  -0.409  0.059  -0.025  -0.063  -0.136 
    (0.171)  (0.166)  (0.155)  (0.059)  (0.082) 
  Δ Group size  0.518  0.262  0.431  0.425  -0.335 
 
Δ Fraction with age 
< 30 
  (0.321)  (0.268)  (0.254)  (0.126)  (0.186) 
               
Note: This table continues on the next page. 
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Table 5 continued 
 

















               
Panel B: Other demographic characteristics   
5)  Impact of min. wage  -0.217  -0.263  -0.276  0.117  -0.255 
    (0.132)  (0.177)  (0.133)  (0.056)  (0.081) 
  Δ Group size  0.027  0.243  0.216  -0.086  -0.035 
 
Δ Fraction  
male 
  (0.248)  (0.347)  (0.244)  (0.103)  (0.173) 
               
6)  Impact of min. wage  -0.021  0.068  -0.005  -0.033  -0.091 
    (0.101)  (0.143)  (0.116)  (0.067)  (0.103) 
  Δ Group size  -0.067  0.191  -0.272  0.053  -0.070 
 
Δ Fraction  
black 
  (0.308)  (0.204)  (0.201)  (0.104)  (0.252) 
               
7)  Impact of min. wage  0.310  -0.389  -0.243  0.031  -0.122 
    (0.160)  (0.194)  (0.109)  (0.076)  (0.128) 
  Δ Group size  -0.187  -0.221  -0.269  -0.539  -0.190 
 
Δ Fraction  
married 
  (0.360)  (0.266)  (0.215)  (0.152)  (0.284) 
               
8)  Impact of min. wage  -0.279  0.052  -0.086  -0.124  -0.008 
    (0.163)  (0.129)  (0.091)  (0.034)  (0.137) 
  Δ Group size  -0.371  0.626  0.066  0.203  0.241 
 
Δ Fraction high 
school dropout 
  (0.403)  (0.230)  (0.263)  (0.082)  (0.283) 
               
Notes: 
1)   The dependent variable is the change in the characteristic listed in the first column between 1989 and 1992 for each skill group. 
2)   The independent variable are Impact of minimum wage, which is a measure of the impact of the 1990/91 federal minimum wage increase in 
each state, and Δ Group size, which is  the change between 1989 and 1992 in the size of the relevant skill group as a fraction of the working-
age population (ages 16-65).  Impact of minimum wage is measured as the fraction of workers between the ages of 16 and 65 whose wage in 
1989 was greater or equal than $3.35/hr and strictly less than $4.25/hr.  
3)   For each skill group and dependent variable, a separate cross-section regression is estimated with the 51 states as observations.  In each 
regression the Impact of minimum wage is instrumented for by its value lagged one year. Huber/White robust standard errors are reported.  
Observations are weighted by the harmonic mean of the number of observations in the two years of each state-skill group cell. 
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Table 6: Effect of minimum wage on employment composition by education  
       

























Reservation wage proxies:         
1)  Impact of min. wage  0.016  0.012  -0.002    0.141  0.064  -0.060 
    (0.060)  (0.042)  (0.045)    (0.101)  (0.068)  (0.113) 
  Δ Group size  0.633  0.002  -0.112    0.429  -0.014  -0.035 
 
Δ Other earnings 
 in household 
(percentiles) 
  (0.555)  (0.147)  (0.098)    (0.758)  (0.324)  (0.283) 
                   
2)  Impact of min. wage  -0.234  -0.147  -0.058    0.599  0.431  0.006 
    (0.216)  (0.179)  (0.149)    (0.271)  (0.197)  (0.185) 
  Δ Group size  0.193  0.632  -0.231    1.871  -1.290  0.616 
 
Δ Nr. of other 
employed persons 
in household 
  (1.498)  (0.308)  (0.368)    (1.949)  (1.024)  (0.480) 
                   
3)  Impact of min. wage  0.459  0.351  0.161    -0.016  0.176  0.080 
    (0.261)  (0.181)  (0.135)    (0.244)  (0.203)  (0.189) 
  Δ Group size  2.327  0.442  0.246    0.159  -2.251  0.261 
 
Δ Nr. of other 
adults in 
household 
  (1.864)  (0.405)  (0.396)    (1.960)  (1.189)  (0.476) 
                   
4)  Impact of min. wage  0.230  -0.112  -0.043    0.294  0.036  0.099 
    (0.123)  (0.086)  (0.088)    (0.150)  (0.100)  (0.176) 
  Δ Group size  0.005  0.277  0.251    0.046  -0.501  -0.367 
 
Δ Fraction with 
age < 30 
  (0.861)  (0.345)  (0.202)    (1.291)  (0.397)  (0.412) 
                   
Notes: 
1)   The dependent variable is the change in the characteristic listed in the first column between 1989 and 1992 for each education group. 
2)   The independent variable are Impact of minimum wage, which is a measure of the impact of the 1990/91 federal minimum wage increase in 
each state, and Δ Group size, which is  the change between 1989 and 1992 in the size of the relevant skill group as a fraction of the working-
age population (ages 16-65).  Impact of minimum wage is measured as the fraction of workers between the ages of 16 and 65 whose wage in 
1989 was greater or equal than $3.35/hr and strictly less than $4.25/hr.  
3)   For each skill group and dependent variable, a separate cross-section regression is estimated with the 51 states as observations.  In each 
regression the Impact of minimum wage is instrumented for by its value lagged one year. Huber/White robust standard errors are reported.  
Observations are weighted by the harmonic mean of the number of observations in the two years of each state-education group cell. 
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Appendix A: Matching individuals in 2 consecutive years of the CPS 
 
  This appendix describes the procedure used to match individuals who appear in 2 
consecutive years of the CPS.  This matching procedure is not straightforward because the CPS 
samples residential units and does not contain person identifiers. Therefore a single residential 
unit identifier may correspond to two different households in cases where a household moves.  
The idea behind the matching procedure is to use information about the sex, race, age and 
relationship codes of individuals within each household to (i) assess the likelihood that a single 
household identifier indeed identifies the same household in both periods and (ii) to match 
individuals within households. Madrian and Lefgren (2000) explain the rotating design of the 
CPS and examine several different matching procedures. My approach is consistent with their 
recommendations.  
  The first column of table A.1 describes the matching process between 1989 and 1990.  
The CPS interviews individuals for 4 consecutive months, then waits 8 months, and interviews 
them again for 4 consecutive months.  The outgoing rotation groups only contain individuals in 
their 4
th or 8
th interview month.  Therefore, only observations in their 4
th interview month in 
1989 or in their 8
th interview month in 1990 need to be considered for a match.  As rows 1a and 
1b show, there are 335,012 such observations with 95,309 distinct household identifiers.  
However, dropping households that appear only in one year leaves 297,712 observations in 
75,245 households (see rows 2a and 2b).  Within each household, the maximum number of 
matches is the lowest number of observations in that household over the 2 years.  As shown in 
row 3, this reduces the number of potential matches to 139,862 or 279,724 person-year 
observations.   43 
  Of these 139,862 potential matches, 122,452 unique matches were identified. Matched 
observations have the same household identifier, race and gender, and the age of the person must 
have increased by two or fewer years.  Some multiple matches are resolved by requiring that the 
age of the person increased by exactly one year and by using the relationship codes.  Multiple 
matches that cannot be resolved are discarded.   
  Even if a unique match is identified, it is unclear that the matched observations refer to 
the same individual.  First, the same household identifier might be used for a different household 
if the original household could not be located by the interviewers.  The matching routine rates 
each matched household on a 5-point scale indicating the likelihood that the same household 
identifier refers to same household.  This rating is based on the number of matched individuals in 
the household, the number of non-matched individuals, their ages and relationship codes.
19 
Second, within the same household, the wrong individuals could be matched to each other.  For 
example, this could happen if one person moved out and a different person of the same age, race 
and gender moved in.  Hence, the quality of the individual matches within each household is also 
rated.  This rating is based on the method used to resolve any multiple matches, on the 
relationship codes and on whether the person aged by exactly one year. 
  These subjective quality ratings are validated using education for the 1989/90 and the 
1990/91 matches.  The education validation is not possible for 1991/92 because the education 
definitions changed.  As expected, the validations show that matches with higher quality ratings 
are less likely to have incompatible education levels, where incompatible education levels are 
those that decrease over time or increase by more than 2 years.  These validations are used to 
                                                             
19 The routine that rates match qualities was constructed to mimic my subjective assessment.  I subjectively rated a large number 
of matches and created an algorithm that best captured these assessments.  This algorithm is too complicated to describe in full 
detail but is available on request.   44 
determine the quality ratings of the household and individual match required for a “high-quality” 
match.  As rows 4a and 4b show, 92.6% of the unique matches in 1989/90 are considered high-
quality.  Of these high-quality matches 2% have incompatible education levels, whereas nearly 
10% of the low-quality matches have incompatible education levels (see rows 5a and 5b).  Of the 
high-quality matches, even the most highly rated matches still have a rate of incompatible 
education levels of 1.9% (not shown in the table).  This raises the suspicion that the base rate of 
misreporting education levels may be close to 1% per year.  In this case, the number of false 
positive matches may be substantially lower than the 2% suggested by the education validation.  
On the other hand, some false positive matches may not be detected by the education validation 
because both individuals happen to have the same level of education. 
  For the estimation of the wage evolution curves, I only use high-quality matches.  Row 6 
shows that 45,687 matches of the 113,429 high-quality matches have non-missing wage data in 
both years.  While this fraction may seem low, one should realize that the matches also include 
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Table A.1: Match quality in the CPS Merge 
           
    1989/90  1990/91  1991/92 
1)  In 4
th sample month in 1
st year or in 8
th sample month in 
2
nd  year 
     
1a)   Households  95,309  95,398  93,630 
1b)   Person-year observations  335,012  340,855  334,242 
2)  Of which the same household identifier occurs in both 
years 
     
2a)   Households  75,245  77,947  76,728 
2b)   Person-year observations  297,712  309,031  303,520 
           
3)  Potential matches (based on nr. obs. in matched 
households) 
139,862  145,154  142,675 
         
4)  Unique matches (based on sex, race, age and 
relationship codes) 
122,452  127,135  125,281 
4a)   Of which match quality is low  9,023  9,197  9,053 
4b)   Of which match quality is high  113,429  117,938  116,228 
      (as % of potential matches)  (81.1 %)  (81.3 %)  (81.5 %) 
      (as % of unique matches)  (92.6 %)  (92.8 %)  (92.8 %) 
           
5)  Validation based on education       
5a)   Low quality matches: % incompatible education  9.7 %  8.7 %  n/a 
5b)   High quality matches: % incompatible education  2.0 %  1.9 %  n/a 
           
6)  High quality matches with non-missing wages in both 
years 
45,687  46,526  45,704 
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Appendix B: Validation of Reservation Wage Proxies 
 
  In this appendix, I examine the empirical validity of the reservation wage proxies using 
the self-reported reservation wage measure from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.  The 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth also has a self-reported reservation wage, but the PSID 
was used because its sample is more representative.  The reservation wage in the PSID is 
measured as the response to the question: “What is the lowest wage or salary you would accept 
on any job?”  This question was only asked of family heads who are not working, not 
temporarily laid off and who have “done anything in the last four weeks to find a job.”
20 
Moreover, the question was only asked from 1980 to 1987, and the sample was restricted to 
individuals between the ages of 16 and 64 for comparability with the CPS sample.  This leaves a 
sample of 3308 person-year observations.  Eliminating individuals with missing education 
information reduces the sample to 3275 person-year observations on 1861 distinct individuals. 
  We would expect a valid proxy to explain the self-reported wage after controlling for 
ability.  Hence, a proxy is judged empirically valid if we find a significantly positive β in a 
regression of the following form: 
 
(self-reported reservation wage)  =  α  +  (reservation wage proxy) β  +  (skill measures) γ  +  ε   
 
The reservation wage proxies from PSID data were constructed to resemble as much as possible 
the four CPS reservation proxies used elsewhere in the paper:  Other earnings in the household 
(as a percentile),  Nr. of other employed persons in household,  Nr. of other adults in household 
and Age less than 30.  However, a number of differences were unavoidable.  First, the PSID 
                                                             
20 In 1985, the question was also asked of non-employed job-searching spouses of family heads.  These individuals are not 
included in the analysis.   47 
proxies are measured at the family level whereas the CPS ones are measured at the household 
level.  Second, Other earnings in the family includes half of the family’s asset income if a wife is 
present and reflects taxable income in the past calendar year, whereas in the CPS no asset 
income is included and earnings are based on usual weekly earnings.  Like the CPS, Other 
earnings in the family excludes any income of the person to whom the reservation wage proxies 
apply and is scaled for family size by dividing by the number of 16-64 year olds in the family.  
Third, Other earnings in the family is expressed as a percentile in each year rather than as a 
percentile in each state-year cell because of sample size considerations. 
  To ensure that the reservation wage proxy reflects the individual’s time and effort cost of 
working rather than an unobserved component of skill, the controls include two skill measures.  
The first is the average hourly earnings of the individual in the past calendar year.  A dummy 
variable is included for the 438 observations with missing average hourly earnings.  The second 
control for skill is the individual’s predicted wage.  This prediction is based on the demographic 
characteristics of this individual, including the reservation wage proxies, year dummies and 
characteristics of the local labor market. It is important that the reservation wage proxies are 
included in order to control for those components of the proxies that reflect skill rather than 
effort and time costs of working.  To predict wages, I first run an OLS regression of log average 
hourly earnings on these individual demographics, year dummies and local labor market 
conditions for a sample of 41,246 working family heads aged 16 to 64.
21  This sample is also 
drawn from the 1980 to 1987 waves of the PSID, but does not overlap with the sample of 
                                                             
21 The demographics and controls include sex, race dummies (black, white and other), marital status dummies 
(married/cohabitating, single, widowed and divorced), education dummies (high school dropout, high school graduate, some 
college, college degree or more), a 6-segment linear spline in age (breakpoints at 20,30,40, 50 and 60), 7 dummies for the number 
of kids under 17, 9 dummies for family size, a 10-segment spline in the first reservation wage proxy (other earnings), a full set of 
dummy variables for the other three reservation wage proxies, year dummies and 7 dummies for the county unemployment rate. 
The adjusted R
2 of this regression is 0.229.   48 
unemployed individuals with self-reported reservation wages.  Next, the coefficients of this 
regression are applied to the demographic and labor market characteristics of the sample with 
self-reported reservation wages to generate a predicted log wage. 
  The results of the OLS regressions of log self-reported reservation wages on the 
reservation wage proxies and skill measures are reported in table B.1.  All four reservation 
proxies have a positive effect on the self-reported reservation wage and the effect is significant 
for all proxies except the third proxy, Nr. of other adults in the family.  Hence, these proxies are 
not only plausible on theoretical grounds but also confirmed empirically.  When all four proxies 
are entered jointly in the regression (not reported), the fourth proxy remains significant but the 
first three become insignificant.  This is not surprising because the first three proxies are highly 
collinear.  The controls for skill are highly significant and the results are as expected; more 
highly skilled individuals have higher reservation wages.     49 
 
Table B.1: Validation of Reservation Wage Proxies 
Dependent Variable: Log self-reported reservation wage 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Reservation wage proxies:         
  Proxy 1: Other earnings in the family (as percentile)  0.079       
    (0.029)       
  Proxy 2: Nr. of other workers in the family    0.033     
      (0.013)     
  Proxy 3: Nr. of other adults in the family      0.018   
        (0.013)   
  Proxy 4: Age < 30        0.038 
          (0.016) 
Measures of skill         
  Predicted log wage (based on demographics)  0.338  0.344  0.343  0.392 
    (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.029) 
  Log average hourly earnings (in past calendar year)  0.263  0.264  0.265  0.265 
    (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
  Dummy for missing average hourly earnings  -0.130  -0.130  -0.132  -0.128 
    (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
           
  R
2  0.3323  0.3318  0.3307  0.3317 
  Number of observations 
 
3275  3275  3275  3275 
Notes: 
1)  Huber/White robust standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are corrected for group error terms for repeated observations of the 
same individual. The 3275 observations come from 1861 distinct individuals. 
2)  The dependent variable is the self-reported reservation wage, which is the answer to the question: “What is the lowest wage or salary you 
would accept on any job?” 
3)  The data are from the PSID.  The reservation wage question was asked from 1980 to 1987 to unemployed family heads who have been 
looking for work in the last four weeks. For consistency with the CPS reservation wage proxies, the sample is limited to individuals aged 
from 16 to 64. Finally, 33 individuals with missing education information were dropped. 
4)  The log average hourly earnings of individuals for whom this variable was initially missing was set equal to the sample mean. 
 